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245 
LEGAL LIMBO: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION IN TURNER v. DRIVER FAILS TO 
CLARIFY THE CONTOURS OF THE 
PUBLIC’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT  
TO RECORD THE POLICE 
Abstract: On February 16, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Turner v. Driver, held that the public has a First Amendment right to 
record the police that is subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions. Although Turner established that the public has a First Amendment 
right to film the police, the decision skirted the question of whether the partic-
ular conduct in Turner—video recording police activity and/or video record-
ing the police station—was an activity protected by the First Amendment. 
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit erred in not clarifying the contours 
of the First Amendment right to film the police. Given the rise in smartphone 
usage, the public’s ability to quickly disseminate videos to a large audience on 
social media, and the campaigns encouraging the public to record the police, 
the Fifth Circuit should have provided stronger guidance for the public on 
how to confidently exercise their First Amendment right to record the police 
in Turner. 
INTRODUCTION 
“I can’t breathe!” panted Eric Garner.1 Those were his last words, spo-
ken as he was choked to death during an arrest by two New York Police De-
partment officers in front of a convenience store in Staten Island, New York 
on July 17, 2014.2 His crime was selling untaxed cigarettes.3 With his cell-
phone, Ramsey Orta, a Staten Island resident, filmed Garner’s final struggle 
for life and created the video that ignited a national movement.4 If it were not 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-
staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/3JA6-XYUK] (discussing the police interaction that led to 
Eric Garner’s death and the effects of a bystander’s recorded video). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See Matt Ford, A Major Victory for the Right to Record Police, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/a-major-victory-for-the-right-to-record-police/
533031/ [https://perma.cc/R52Q-AJRL] (discussing the recent legal developments relating to the 
public’s First Amendment right to record the police). Ramsay Orta’s video, and other videos of 
police encounters with unarmed black men and women that rapidly circulated on social media, 
sparked the Black Lives Matter movement and national protests about the importance of police 
reform. Id.; Nicole Narea, Protecting the Right to Record Police Brutality, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 
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for Orta’s video and the countless other cellphone recorded videos by mem-
bers of the public that have shown the fatal interactions between citizens and 
police in the United States, it is unlikely that there would be such a strong 
national call to action for better policing policies.5 Over the past several 
years, there has been a growing movement to protect the public’s right to rec-
ord the police.6 In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the public’s ability to record police activity in Turner v. Driver.7 The 
Turner majority opinion concluded that “First Amendment principles, con-
trolling authority, and persuasive precedent demonstrate that a First Amend-
ment right to record the police does exist, subject only to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions.”8 
With this decision, the Fifth Circuit joined the majority of the Federal 
Courts of Appeals in ruling that the public has a First Amendment right to 
videotape encounters with law enforcement.9 Although Turner established 
that the public has a First Amendment right to film the police, it skirted the 
question of whether the particular conduct in Turner—video recording po-
                                                                                                                           
7, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/137533/protecting-right-record-police-brutality [https://
perma.cc/3AZD-GJ2P] (discussing the need for policymakers to step in and address the retaliation 
that citizens face from the police for video recording the police). 
 5 See Mercy Benzaquen et al., The Raw Videos That Have Sparked Outrage Over Police 
Treatment of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/
19/us/police-videos-race.html [https://perma.cc/E4JJ-WVFB] (describing and depicting a timeline 
of video footage of police using excessive force and questionable police behavior with African 
Americans); Ford, supra note 4. 
 6 See Narea, supra note 4. There has been public pressure on states and cities to create policies 
that protect the right to film the police. Id. “Colorado passed legislation making it illegal to interfere 
with civilians lawfully recording the police” in May 2015. Id.; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128 
(2016) (giving the public a right to recover against a police officer who seizes, destroys, or damages a 
person’s recording device or video while lawfully recording an incident with the police officer). In 
addition, California passed similar legislation that clarifies a First Amendment right to record the 
police while they are on duty in a public space, “without fear of intimidation or arrest” in 2015. Nar-
ea, supra note 4; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b) (2016) (clarifying that a person who lawfully records 
a police officer is not deterring that officer from performing his or her duties). While not as forward 
as Colorado and California, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) distributed a “Right to 
Know” internal memo with changes to the police administrative rules. Narea, supra note 4. These 
changes require officers to hand out business cards when requested and request consent to conduct 
searches in the absence of legal basis. See J. David Goodman, New York Council Won’t Vote on 
Police Reform Bills, but Agency Agrees to Changes, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/07/13/nyregion/new-york-city-council-will-not-vote-on-police-reform-measures.
html [https://perma.cc/4NG8-NR5J]. Nonetheless, these administrative changes do not have the same 
power as legislation, and compliance is contingent upon the NYPD’s internal enforcement of these 
new rules. See id. 
 7 See Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 8 Id. at 688. 
 9 See id. at 687 (citing ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012), Glik v. 
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2011), and Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 
1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). No federal appellate court has ruled to the contrary and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not ruled on the subject. Ford, supra note 4. 
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lice activity and/or video recording the police station—was protected First 
Amendment activity.10 The Fifth Circuit’s failure to apply the particular 
facts of Turner to the established rule left the contours of the public’s First 
Amendment right to film the police in legal limbo.11 In her dissenting opinion 
in Turner, Judge Edith Brown Clement recognized that the majority erred by 
establishing a law without particularizing it to the facts in the case.12 
This Comment focuses on the zone of conduct protected by the pub-
lic’s First Amendment right to film the police.13 Part I of this Comment 
provides an overview of Turner, with a focus on the Fifth Circuit’s First 
Amendment analysis.14 Part II discusses the current state of the law with 
respect to the conduct parameters of the public’s First Amendment right to 
video record the police and analyzes legislation passed by Colorado, Ore-
gon, and California to secure this right.15 Lastly, Part III argues that the 
Fifth Circuit should have clarified exactly what conduct was clearly estab-
lished after their ruling in Turner to add to the standard for the zone of con-
duct protected by the First Amendment right to record the police.16 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 685. The Fifth Circuit analyzed Turner’s conduct through the two-
pronged qualified immunity test. Id. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil 
liability when acting in their official capacity and when their “actions could reasonably have been 
believed to be legal.” Id. When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff has 
to show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The 
Fifth Circuit made it clear that because the district court’s qualified immunity analysis rested on 
the “clearly established” prong and not the constitutional right violation prong, the Fifth Circuit 
would follow the same sequence of analysis. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, had the discretion to 
analyze the constitutional right prong first. Id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit upheld the police 
officers’ qualified immunity defense, reasoning that at the time of the alleged conduct, the First 
Amendment right to record the police had not been clearly established. See id. at 687. By showing 
that the law was not clearly established, the Fifth Circuit ended its analysis on Turner’s conduct 
and remained silent as to whether Turner was actually exercising a First Amendment right that 
was subsequently violated by a public official. See id. 
 11 See id. at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting) (“The majority does not determine that the officers 
here violated Turner’s First Amendment rights—perhaps because it would be reasonable for secu-
rity reasons to restrict individuals from filming police officers entering and leaving a police sta-
tion. Because the majority does not hold that the officers actually violated the First Amendment, 
‘an officer acting under similar circumstances’ in the future will not have violated any clearly 
established law.”) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). 
 12 See id. 
 13 See infra notes 14–127 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 17–47 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 48–104 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 105–127 and accompanying text. 
248 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
I. ANALYSIS OF TURNER V. DRIVER 
 In February 2017, the Fifth Circuit, in Turner v. Driver, ruled that the 
public has a First Amendment right to record the police.17 Section A of this 
Part examines the facts and procedural history in Turner.18 Section B of this 
Part provides an in-depth analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Turner.19  
A. Turner v. Driver: Facts and Procedural History 
 In September 2015, Phillip Turner videotaped the Fort Worth Police 
Station from a public sidewalk located across the street.20 He was not carry-
ing any weapons.21 While videotaping, two police officers approached 
Turner and asked to see his identification card (“ID”).22 Turner refused to 
show the officers his ID and proceeded to ask if he was being detained.23 
One of the officers responded that Turner was being “detained for investiga-
tion and that the officers were concerned about who was walking around 
with a video camera.”24 Turner asked for which crime he was being de-
tained and the same officer replied, “I didn’t say you committed a crime.”25 
After being asked for his ID and refusing to present it for a second time, 
Turner was suddenly detained, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the 
officers’ patrol car.26 Turner asked to see a supervisor.27 A supervisor ar-
rived on the scene and after a brief time, Turner was released without a 
charge.28 
Turner brought a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
two police officers and their supervisor in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas, alleging that the officers violated his First Amend-
ment right to record police activity and his Fourth Amendment rights to be 
free from “detention absent reasonable suspicion” and unlawful arrest.29 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 18 See infra notes 20–35 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. 
 20 Turner, 848 F.3d at 683. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 684. 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”); id. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
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Each police officer filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that they were enti-
tled to qualified immunity for Turner’s cause of actions.30 
The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from li-
ability for damages “when their actions could reasonably have been be-
lieved to be legal.”31 When a defendant asserts a qualified immunity de-
fense, the burden falls on the plaintiff to prove that it does not apply.32 Ac-
cording to the district court in Turner’s case, to meet the qualified immunity 
burden, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the 
time of the challenged conduct.”33 The district court granted the police of-
                                                                                                                           
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 
(providing a private remedy for violations of the Constitution by government actors); Turner, 848 
F.3d at 684, 690. 
 30 Turner, 848 F.3d at 684. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil lia-
bility when acting in their official capacity and when their “actions could reasonably have been 
believed to be legal.” Id. at 685. When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plain-
tiff has to show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the 
right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. 
 31 Id. at 685. Qualified immunity provides a layer of protection to government officials, 
thereby enabling them to fully perform their duties and exercise their discretion without the fear of 
financial liability or litigation. Sonja Marrett, Turkmen v. Hasty: The Second Circuit Holds High-
est Ranking Law Enforcement Officials Accountable for Post–9/11 Policies Infringing on Consti-
tutional Rights, 57 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 194, 209 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=3506&context=bclr [https://perma.cc/NV7Y-NT6U] (arguing that quali-
fied immunity should not apply in the national security context because it prevents victims from 
recovering damages in constitutional and counter-terrorism lawsuits). Yet critics argue that this 
type of protection is unnecessary because all law enforcement officers are represented by counsel 
for free and are indemnified for settlements and judgments entered against them. Joanna C. 
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 59 (2017) (“In the six-year period 
from 2006 to 2011, law enforcement officers in forty-four of the seventy largest law enforcement 
agencies paid just 0.02% of the dollars awarded to plaintiffs in police misconduct suits.”). 
 32 Turner, 848 F.3d at 685. There is currently a circuit split regarding who has the burden of 
proof on a qualified immunity defense. Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immuni-
ty, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 143–45 (2012) (arguing that the defendant should bear the burden of 
proof when invoking a qualified immunity defense). The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Elev-
enth Circuits place the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Id. at 143–44. Conversely, the First, Sec-
ond, Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits place the burden of proof on the defendant. Id. at 144–45. In 
addition, the Fourth and Eight Circuits take a slightly different approach. Id. at 145. The Eight 
Circuit places the burden of establishing that the law was clearly established on the plaintiff and 
places the burden of establishing that the defendant did not violate a constitutional right on the 
defendant. Id. The Fourth Circuit does the opposite. Id. 
 33 Turner, 848 F.3d at 685; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009) (lay-
ing out the two-pronged qualified-immunity test and granting judicial discretion regarding which 
prong to address first). In 2001, in Saucier v. Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the quali-
fied-immunity test must be addressed in proper sequence. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (requiring that 
courts must first answer whether the alleged facts violated a constitutional right, and if a violation 
occurred, the court would then continue to the “clearly established” prong). Id. The Court changed 
this requirement in 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan, and allowed courts to use their discretion to 
decide which prong to address first. 555 U.S. at 236 (relaxing the sequence and granting judicial 
discretion for analyzing qualified immunity). 
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ficers’ motions to dismiss, finding that Turner did not show that the police 
officers acted unreasonably and in violation of any of his clearly established 
constitutional rights.34 Turner appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit.35 
B. Discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Turner v. Driver 
On February 16, 2017, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part the district court’s order dismissing Turner’s 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claims on the basis of qualified immunity.36 The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that at the time of Turner’s arrest, neither the U.S. Supreme Court 
nor the Fifth Circuit had determined whether First Amendment protections 
extended to filming police.37 Therefore, the court could not say that the law 
clearly and unambiguously prohibited the police officers’ conduct.38 Given 
the circuit split regarding whether or not the First Amendment right to film 
the police has been clearly established, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity 
against Turner’s First Amendment civil rights violation allegation.39 The 
Fifth Circuit’s holding in Turner set precedent by ruling, as a matter of first 
impression, that recording police activity is protected by the First Amend-
ment, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.40 
Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Turner’s First 
Amendment claim, it reversed the district court’s dismissal of Turner’s 
Fourth Amendment claim by holding that the police officers were not enti-
tled to qualified immunity under Turner’s Fourth Amendment rights viola-
tion that claimed that the police officers arrested him without probable 
cause.41 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Fourth Amendment right to be 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Turner, 848 F.3d at 684. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 696. 
 37 See id. at 686 (stating that because neither of these courts had addressed the public’s First 
Amendment right to record the police prior to Turner, then the right was not clearly established in 
the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction). 
 38 See id. at 686–87 (“Circuit courts are split as to whether or not there is a clearly established 
First Amendment right to record the public activities of police. The circuit courts are not split, 
however, on whether the right exists.”). 
 39 Id. at 686 (“If judges . . . disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police 
to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 
U.S. 603, 618 (1999)). When the state of a constitutional law is underdeveloped, police officers 
cannot be expected to predict the future course of the law. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617. 
 40 Turner, 848 F.3d at 687 (“Although the right was not clearly established at the time of 
Turner’s activities, whether such a right exists and is protected by the First Amendment presents a 
separate and distinct question. Because the issue continues to arise in the qualified immunity con-
text, we now proceed to determine it for the future.”). 
 41 See id. (the Fifth Circuit examined the plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment claims and 
held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that 
the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause). 
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free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established and that no 
objectively reasonable person would believe there to be probable cause to 
arrest Turner given the circumstances.42 
Judge Clement dissented from the Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion with 
regard to the establishment of a First Amendment right to film the police 
and the reversal of the qualified immunity ruling for the officers under 
Turner’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim.43 In discussing the First 
Amendment right to film the police, she focused on the Supreme Court’s 
insistence that expressly stated, recognized laws should be unambiguous, 
rather than obscure or abstract.44 In fact, Judge Clement asserted that clearly 
established law should be specific to the unique circumstances of the case.45 
She reasoned that the majority asserted a First Amendment right to film the 
police that was unnecessary and unconnected to the particular facts in the 
case.46 Thus, by failing to connect the facts of Turner’s case to the First 
Amendment right the majority subsequently established and by failing to 
determine if the police officers actually violated that right, the Fifth Circuit 
did not properly set out the law as they intended.47 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ZONE OF CONDUCT PROTECTED BY THE PUBLIC’S 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD THE POLICE IN CASE  
LAW AND STATE LEGISLATION 
In Turner v. Driver, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed whether the public has a First Amendment right to videotape the 
actions of police officers.48 The Fifth Circuit held that the public does have 
a right to film law enforcement, but that the recording of police officers 
may be curtailed by reasonable time, place, and manner limitations.49 The 
Fifth Circuit agreed with every circuit that has ruled on this question that 
the First Amendment principles of free speech extend to the right to film the 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. at 694 (explaining that Turner neither aggressively threatened—or otherwise provoked—
the officers nor attempted to flee or leave the scene). 
 43 Id. at 696 (Clement, J., dissenting). 
 44 Id. at 696–97 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). 
 45 Id. at 697 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 46 Id. (“To the extent there is any consensus of persuasive authority, those cases focus only on 
the narrow issue of whether there is a First Amendment right to film the police ‘carrying out their 
duties in public.’ Turner did not allege that he filmed police officers conducting their public du-
ties, but rather that he filmed a police station.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 47 See id. (“Because the majority does not hold that the officers actually violated the First 
Amendment, ‘an officer acting under similar circumstances’ in the future will not have violated 
any clearly established law.”). 
 48 Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 49 Id. The Fifth Circuit did not find it necessary to address the time, place, and manner re-
strictions in Turner because there were none imposed or in place at the time of the plaintiff’s ac-
tions. Id. 
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police.50 A significant reason for the Fifth Circuit’s determination was that 
“filming the police contributes to the public’s ability to hold the police ac-
countable, ensure that police officers are not abusing their power, and make 
informed decisions about police policy.”51 In making this determination, the 
court relied on precedent that focused on the First Amendment’s protection 
of news-gathering, film, and the right to receive information and ideas.52 
Yet, the court did not explain which specific time, place, and manner re-
strictions would be reasonable in the situation that arose in Turner.53 The 
only clarifications given regarding these restrictions was that they must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.”54 Section A 
of this Part focuses on the case law that developed the First Amendment 
right to record the police.55 Section B of this Part focuses on state legisla-
tion that codifies this right.56  
A. Case Law Establishing the First Amendment  
Right to Record the Police 
Prior to Turner, there was a growing consensus among the courts that 
First Amendment rights exist for individuals who video record the public ac-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. at 687; ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects the audio recording of police and concluding that an Illinois wiretap-
ping statute burdens the public First Amendment rights); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82, 85 
(1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the public has a First Amendment right to videotape the police given 
First Amendment principles and case law); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that there exists a First Amendment right to videotape police subject to time, 
manner, and place restrictions). 
 51 Turner, 848 F.3d at 689. The Fifth Circuit further reasoned that “filming the police also 
frequently helps officers; for example, a citizen’s recording might corroborate a probable cause 
finding or might even exonerate an officer charged with wrongdoing.” Id. 
 52 Id. at 688 (describing the First Amendment’s history of protecting film and newsgathering). 
The First Amendment protects newsgathering “from any source by means within the law.” 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). This protection extends to films and the act of 
making films. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 
688 (1959). In addition to the First Amendment’s protection of the broader right to film, the prin-
ciples underlying the First Amendment support the particular right to film the police because it 
leads to government accountability. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).  
 53 Turner, 848 F.3d at 690. 
 54 Id. Restrictions on the public’s right to record police receive heightened judicial scrutiny, 
yet it is not quite on the level of strict scrutiny. See Elizabeth J. Frawley, No Calling Cut: The 
Political Right to Record Police, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 287, 295–96 (2014) (arguing that re-
strictions on the right to record the police should be given the highest level of scrutiny given po-
lice officer’s power and potential for abuse). This is because although these restrictions are con-
tent neutral, they encompass political speech that the First Amendment protects, resulting in the 
higher review standard. Id. 
 55 See infra notes 57–88 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 89–103 and accompanying text. 
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tivities of police.57 In 2000, in Smith v. City of Cumming, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had a First Amendment 
right to photograph or videotape police conduct on public property because 
the First Amendment protects the public’s ability to gather information on 
public officials who are acting in their official capacities in public places.58 In 
Smith, the plaintiff, a member of the public, believed that the Cumming Po-
lice Department was inappropriately stopping vehicles in order to increase 
ticket revenue.59 Accordingly, the plaintiff used a police scanner to track po-
lice cars and videotape random traffic stops.60 The plaintiff videotaped these 
traffic stops from public property and did so without interfering with the po-
lice officers’ ability to do their work.61 Nonetheless, the police obtained an 
arrest warrant for plaintiff and arrested him at his job.62 The case regarding 
plaintiff’s arrest was dismissed and he filed a § 1983 complaint against the 
city alleging First Amendment violations.63 Even though the Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that the public had the right to record the activity of police on public 
property, it held that the plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence to prove the 
actions of the police rose to the level of a § 1983 claim.64 
In 2007, in Glik v. Cunniffe, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit provided more clarity on the types of conduct included within the 
public’s First Amendment right to record the police.65 In Glik, the plaintiff 
was walking past the Boston Commons—a public park in Boston—when he 
witnessed police officers arresting a man.66 After hearing a bystander com-
ment on the officers’ use of excessive force during the arrest, the plaintiff 
used his cell phone to film the officers from a distance, without speaking to 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See ACLU of Ill., 679 F.3d at 608 (holding that the First Amendment protects audio record-
ing police officers); Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (holding that the First Amendment protects video record-
ing police officers); Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (holding that the public has a First Amendment right 
to video record police officers subject to time, place, and manner restrictions). 
 58 212 F.3d at 1333; see also Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing a broad First Amendment right to record incidents of general public concern); Black-
ston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that filming public meetings is pro-
tected by the First Amendment). 
 59 Taylor Robertson, Lights, Camera, Arrest: The Stage Is Set for a Federal Resolution of a 
Citizen’s Right to Record the Police in Public, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 131 (2014) (summariz-
ing the facts of Smith). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 131–32. 
 63 Id. at 132. 
 64 See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (stating that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs needed to 
prove that the police’s conduct deprived them of a constitutional right, and even though the plain-
tiffs had a right to videotape police activities, they did not provide enough evidence to show that 
the police’s actions violated that right). 
 65 655 F.3d at 82 (clarifying that members of the public should be a safe and appropriate dis-
tance away from the police officer so that they do not interfere with the police’s duties). 
 66 Id. at 79. 
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the officers or otherwise interfering with their actions in any way.67 After in-
forming the officers that he was video recording the arrest, the plaintiff was 
arrested on several charges, including for a violation of the Massachusetts 
wiretap statute.68 The plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the officers 
and the City of Boston alleging First and Fourth Amendment rights violations 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the officers raised qualified immunity defenses.69 
The First Circuit started their analysis of the First Amendment civil 
rights claim with the first prong of the qualified immunity test by consider-
ing whether there is a constitutionally protected right to record law en-
forcement acting in their official capacity in public.70 The court held that the 
answer was a resounding yes.71 Although the First Amendment specifically 
mentions the press, given the technological advances, there is now a fine 
line between a journalist and a private citizen.72 Moreover, the increased 
availability and usage of smart phones and cameras make news creation just 
as likely to come from citizens on their personal devices as a professional 
journalist.73 Thus, the Glik court held, the First Amendment news gathering 
protections must extend to the public.74 With this analysis, the First Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 80. 
 68 Id. at 86–87. The Massachusetts wiretap statute makes it a crime to “willfully commit[] an 
interception . . . of any wire or oral communication.” Id. at 86 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
272, § 99(C)(1) (2010)). The court noted that the term “interception” under the statute is defined 
to mean “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the 
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any 
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication.” Id. (quot-
ing ch. 272, § 99(B)(4)). The Glik court had to determine if the plaintiff had secretly videotaped 
the police officers. Id. at 87. The court found that the plaintiff openly recorded the police because 
his phone was in plain view; thus, he was not in violation of the wiretap law. Id. 
 69 Id. at 80. 
 70 See id. at 82 (using its discretion and analyzing the constitutional right prong of the quali-
fied immunity doctrine first in order to establish the right to record the police). Most courts have 
used this discretion to avoid the constitutional right prong and have only analyzed the clearly 
established prong. See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Further Developments in the Post-
Pearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REV. 243, 248 (2011) (arguing that the majority of courts assess the 
second prong of the qualified immunity test first to avoid analyzing whether a constitutional rights 
violation occurred). 
 71 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11) (mentioning the right to gather news 
from any lawful means); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) 
(reasoning that the First Amendment prevents government from limiting the stock of information 
from which public may draw); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (reiterating the well-
established and constitutionally protected right to receive information and ideas). 
 72 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84; Kate Bulkley, The Rise of Citizen Journalism, GUARDIAN (Jun. 10, 
2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/11/rise-of-citizen-journalism [https://perma.cc/
9NC6-T8NY] (discussing how the increase in technology is changing the documentary filmmaking 
landscape by allowing citizen journalists to add a richer dimension to current affairs). 
 73 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82; Bulkley, supra note 72 (discussing that the new digital world of social 
media makes it difficult for the public to judge the value of an amateur video shot on a cellphone 
against a documentary broadcasted on traditional television). 
 74 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. 
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concluded that First Amendment principles encompassed filming police 
officers performing their duties in a public place.75 
In Glik, the First Circuit focused on two parameters when deciding that 
the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to record the police.76 First, it fo-
cused on the location of the videotaping, the Boston Common, noting that it 
was “the oldest city park in the United States and the apotheosis of a public 
forum.”77 Given the traditionally public nature of the park, the state’s ability 
to limit free speech there was stringently constrained.78 Second, the First 
Circuit focused on the plaintiff’s distance from the defendants while film-
ing.79 The court stated that the plaintiff recorded the officers from a safe, 
appropriate distance and neither verbally harassed them nor interfered with 
their actions in any manner, only answering their questions and state-
ments.80 Given these facts, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s peaceful 
recording of an arrest in a public space did not interfere with the police of-
ficers’ performance of their duties.81 
Building on both the persuasive and controlling decisions handed 
down by the various Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the First Amend-
ment right to record the police, in 2015, in Higginbotham v. City of New 
York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 
the right to record police activity “at least in the case of a journalist who 
was otherwise unconnected to the events recorded, was in fact ‘clearly es-
tablished.’”82 While the Higginbotham court focused its holding on the vid-
eorecorder being a journalist who was a nonparticipant in the events that he 
was recording, its reasoning contributed to a deeper understanding of the 
zone of conduct protected by this First Amendment right.83 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. at 84. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) 
(emphasizing that the U.S. Supreme Court is strongly against the state limiting the public’s First 
Amendment activity in traditionally public spaces). 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608 (invalidating 
a state’s eavesdropping statute and holding that the First Amendment protects audio recording 
police officers performing their duties in public); Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (holding that the First 
Amendment protects video recording police officers and that right was clearly established); Smith, 
212 F.3d at 1333 (recognizing First Amendment right to video record police officers subject to 
time, place, and manner restrictions); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439 (recognizing the First Amendment 
right to film matters of public interest after he plaintiff was arrested for filming the police at a 
protest). 
 83 See Higginbotham, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 381 (clarifying that the First Amendment right to 
record police exists when the recording is done from a reasonable distance and ends when the 
recording prevents the police officers from fully performing their duties). The plaintiff was in this 
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In Higginbotham, the plaintiff was arrested while filming an arrest dur-
ing an Occupy Wall Street demonstration in Manhattan, New York from the 
top of a telephone booth.84 Subsequently, the plaintiff filed § 1983 claims 
for First and Fourth Amendment violations.85 The court held that the plain-
tiff’s First Amendment rights were violated.86 Nonetheless, in making that 
determination, the court noted that the right to video record police is not 
without limits.87 The court explained that the right to record the police may 
not apply: 1) “in particularly dangerous situations,” (2) “if the recording 
interferes with the police activity,” (3) “if [the recording] is surreptitious,” 
(4) “if [the recording] is done by the subject of the police activity,” or (5) “if 
the police activity is part of an undercover investigation.”88 These five ex-
plicit exemptions served to broadly expand the understanding of the ap-
proved and unapproved conduct for filming the police.89 
B. State Legislation on the Right to Record the Police 
Several states have passed legislation to protect the public’s First 
Amendment right to record the police.90 These statutes codify the public’s 
                                                                                                                           
zone because he did not interfere with the arrest that he was recording and was at the protest in his 
role as a professional journalist. Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Generally Protects Videore-
cording of Police, and This Right Is ‘Clearly Established,’ WASH. POST (May 14, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/14/first-amendment-generally-
protects-videorecording-of-police-and-this-right-is-clearly-established/?utm_term=.d262501cced8 
[https://perma.cc/NG29-PAV3] (arguing that the court’s holding on the clearly established prong 
of the qualified immunity test is a big win for the plaintiff because it enables him to collect dam-
ages from the defendant). Thus, a reasonable police officer would have been on notice that retali-
ating against the plaintiff for filming violated his First Amendment rights. Id.  
 84 See Higginbotham, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 372. 
 85 Id. at 372, 378 (alleging a false arrest that violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and 
a First Amendment retaliation claim; these claims are similar to the plaintiff’s claims in Turner). 
 86 Id. at 381, 382. 
 87 Id. at 381. 
 88 Id. The court held that the plaintiff’s conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
This was because he was a professional journalist and was at the demonstration to record it and 
not to participate in it. Id. Additionally, there was no record that showed that his filming interfered 
with the police performing their duties during the arrest. Id. The court concluded that “a reasona-
ble police officer would have been on notice that retaliating against a non-participant, professional 
journalist for filming an arrest under the circumstances alleged would violate the First Amend-
ment.” Id. 
 89 See id.; Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images of Police in Public 
Places: The Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX. 
A&M L. REV. 131, 139–62 (2015) (discussing the history of the First Amendment right to record 
the police and explaining case law that has articulated the contours of that right). 
 90 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b) (2016) (providing that a person who takes a photograph or 
makes an audio or video recording of a police officer in a public place is not preventing that of-
ficer from performing his duties); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128 (2016) (giving the public the 
right to recover civil damages when a police officer destroys or unlawfully seizes video from a 
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First Amendment right to record the police, but they still leave uncertainty 
regarding the contours of that right.91 Specifically, there is ambiguity 
around what constitutes police activity.92 The state of Colorado passed a 
statute that broadly interprets the zone of conduct protected by the First 
Amendment right to record the police.93 Colorado’s statute, which was en-
acted on May 20, 2015, gives members of the public the right to record any 
incident involving a police officer.94 It also allows the public to maintain 
both custody and control of the recording and the device used to record, 
preventing the police from seizing the recording device without a search 
warrant or subpoena.95 Yet, the Colorado statute fails to define the term “an 
incident.”96 This lack of a clear definition expands when the public can rec-
ord the police, and leaves it to the courts to interpret the phrase “an inci-
dent.”97 Courts may even interpret the Colorado law as giving the public a 
much broader right than just recording the police publicly performing their 
duties.98 
Oregon and California have also passed legislation in 2015 that pro-
tects the First Amendment right to record the police, but the language in 
both pieces of legislation is more specific than the language found in the 
Colorado statute.99 Oregon’s statute allows the public to record a conversa-
tion in which a police officer is a participant if the officer is acting in an 
official capacity, the recording is made “openly and in plain view of the par-
ticipants in the conversation,” the conversation “recorded is audible to the 
                                                                                                                           
person lawfully recording the police officer); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5) (2016) (providing that 
recording a police officer is not a crime of interfering with the police officer). 
 91 CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128; OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5). 
 92 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b) (stating that the public has the right to record the police in 
public places but does not explicitly limit that right to the police performing their official duties); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128 (giving the public the ability to record “an incident” involving the 
police); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5) (giving the public the ability to record the police conducting 
official duties, but failing to define “official duties”). 
 93 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128. The Colorado law was created and passed after Colorado 
residents complained about police officers confiscating their recordings of the police. See Lindsay 
Watts, ‘Right to Record’ Bill Addresses Citizens’ Right to Film Law Enforcement, DENVER CHANNEL 
(Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/politics/right-to-record-bill-addresses-
citizens-right-to-film-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/FA49-CD2F]. The police shooting of Jessica 
Hernandez in Colorado prompted the legislation when another resident who tried to film the shooting 
was apprehended and prevented from filming the officers. See id. (arguing that the number of news 
reports about the police taking away recording devices from the public prompted the state legislators 
to act and create a bill addressing this issue). 
 94 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. The use of the words “an incident” shifts the focus from what the police are doing 
when they are being filmed to where the police are and how public that place is. Id. 
 99 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b), with OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5). 
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person by normal unaided hearing,” and the person recording is in a place 
he or she has the right to be.100 Although Oregon’s statute is much more 
specific than Colorado’s statute regarding the parameters of when the public 
can record the police, it fails to define “official duties.”101 This results in the 
lack of clarity regarding exactly what the public can record the police do-
ing.102 California’s statute regarding recording police officers has similar 
language to Oregon’s statute, but instead of giving the public the ability to 
record the police “performing official duties,” it allows the public to record 
the police “while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the 
photograph or making the recording is in a place he or she has the right to 
be.”103 The California statute focuses on where the police officers are in-
stead of what they are doing when they are being recorded.104 
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S FIRST AMENDMENT HOLDING IN  
TURNER AND THE NEED FOR A CLEAR STANDARD 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 2017 deci-
sion in Turner v. Driver established that the First Amendment right for the 
public to record the police exists, it did not further clarify the conduct in-
cluded within the parameters of that right.105 This is particularly important 
because it is ambiguous whether the Fifth Circuit’s holding aligns with the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5). Prior to the enactment of the law, it was a crime to record a 
conversation in Oregon without specifically informing the parties to the conversation. Victory! 
The Right to Film the Police Passes the Oregon Legislature, ACLU OR. (June 16, 2015), https://
aclu-or.org/en/legislation/victory-right-film-police-bill-passes-oregon-legislature [https://perma.
cc/ET7D-ESQ4]. The law amended Oregon’s eavesdropping statute by adding an exemption for 
recording police officers. Id.; § 165.540(1)(c) (stating that it is unlawful to record conversations 
without the consent of all participants). This exemption changed the requirement that a member of 
the public specifically inform the officer that he or she is being recorded to allowing a member of 
the public to record the officer without consent if, among other requirements, “the recording is 
made openly and in plain view.” § 165.540(5)(b)(B). 
 101 Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128. 
 102 Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128. These bills 
highlight that lack of a clear definition of “official duties” makes it difficult for the public to know 
when they can and cannot record the police and may lead to members of the public exercising 
their right to record the police incorrectly. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5), with COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-21-128. 
 103 CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b). The office of the state senator who introduced the bill that 
would become § 69(b), Senator Ricardo Lara, released a statement on the day that the bill was 
signed into law by California Governor Jerry Brown that provided further insight on why the bill 
was created. Governor Brown Signs Right to Record Act, RICARDO LARA (August 11, 2015), 
http://sd33.senate.ca.gov/news/2015-08-11-governor-brown-signs-right-record-act 
[https://perma.cc/5CVL-QKS9]. The statement notes that “[a]t a time when cell phone and video 
footage is helping steer important national civil rights conversations, passage of the Right to Rec-
ord Act sets an example for the rest of the nation to follow.” Id. 
 104 CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b). 
 105 See Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 697 (5th Cir. 2017) (Clement, J., dissenting). 
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facts in the case.106 By failing to particularize the facts in the case to the 
established First Amendment right to record the police, the Fifth Circuit 
failed to add to the zone of conduct protected by this right and has left the 
public without a clear path forward.107  
Turner’s majority opinion and dissent make it clear that at no point did 
the Fifth Circuit classify the plaintiff’s action to determine whether he was 
filming the police station, the police entering and exiting the police station, 
and/or both.108 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit failed to determine if Turner had 
a protected First Amendment right to record the police during the event in 
question.109 These determinations are absolutely pivotal to further establish-
ing the contours of the First Amendment right to film the police, especially 
given that other Courts of Appeals, having established this right, did so 
when a member of the public was arrested for filming a police arrest or traf-
fic stop.110 
Judge Clement focused on this ambiguity in her dissent in Turner.111 
She argued that there is a consensus of persuasive authority on the First 
Amendment right to film the police acting in their official capacity as offic-
ers in public.112 Yet, at no point did the Fifth Circuit determine whether or 
not the police were carrying out their duties in public in Turner.113 Judge 
Clement focused on the point that Turner alleged that he was filming the 
police station, not that he was filming the police officers conducting their 
public duties.114 Since the Fifth Circuit did not determine that Turner’s First 
Amendment rights were violated, the court did not properly establish that 
Turner had a First Amendment right, nor did it establish that his conduct 
was within the zone of conduct protected by the First Amendment right to 
film the police.115 In fact, it added no clarity to the currently developing 
body of law surrounding the filming of police officers that is in need of in-
terpretation.116 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. 
 107 See infra notes 108–127 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 687; infra notes 108–127 and accompanying text. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82, 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (showing that the plaintiff was 
arrested for filming an arrest in a public park); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 
(11th Cir. 2000) (showing that the plaintiff was arrested for filming the police conducting traffic 
stops). 
 111 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See id.; Calvert, supra note 89, at 139–62 (discussing the case law that highlights the con-
duct parameters protected by the First Amendment right to record the police). 
 116 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting); Matthew Slaughter, First Amend-
ment Right to Record Police: When Clearly Established Is Not Clear Enough, 49 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 101, 121 (2015) (arguing that the right to record police in public is a prudent policy decision 
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The Fifth Circuit erred by not clarifying the contours of the First 
Amendment right to film the police.117 With the emergence of technology 
and the pervasive use of smartphones in the United States, more people than 
ever before have the ability to record the police and disseminate videos to a 
broader audience in a short period of time.118 In fact, an assessment from 
the Pew Research Center shows that 77% of Americans own smartphones 
and 70% Americans use social media.119 With recent campaigns from advo-
cacy organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, encourag-
ing the public to record the police, the courts have a responsibility to create 
a clear standard so that individuals can confidently exercise their First 
Amendment rights.120 Additionally, only a few states have passed legisla-
tion codifying the right to record the police, and the statutes that have been 
passed are not detailed enough.121 The lack of clear definitions regarding 
what and when the public can record, particularly concerning police activi-
ties, makes it difficult for these pieces of legislation to provide adequate 
protections.122 Thus, the courts can no longer put the contours of the First 
Amendment right to film the police on the back burner.123 This is a front 
                                                                                                                           
because it aids evidentiary interests, assists with the public’s conduct, and deters police miscon-
duct).  
 117 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 696 (Clement, J., dissenting). 
 118 Kirk Miller, Watching the Watchers: Theorizing Cops, Cameras, and Police Legitimacy in 
the 21st Century, in THE POLITICS OF POLICING: BETWEEN FORCE AND LEGITIMACY 257, 258 
(Mathieu Deflem ed. 2016) (discussing the use of video to document police interactions with the 
public and how upgrades in technology adds to a new visibility of policing and changes the dy-
namics of traditional police/community relations). 
 119 Aaron Smith, Record Shares of Americans Now Own Smartphones, Have Home Broadband, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-of-
technology/ [https://perma.cc/JH34-LD4V]. Most young adults have smartphones and nearly three-
quarters (74%) of Americans ages fifty to sixty-four are now smartphone owners. Id. This is a 
sixteen percentage-point increase compared to 2015. Id. Furthermore, social media usage has 
drastically increased with 69% of U.S. adults using it. Id. 
 120 ACLU Apps to Record Police Conduct, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-
reform/reforming-police-practices/aclu-apps-record-police-conduct [https://perma.cc/2CBU-9DQY] 
(encouraging the public to download the smartphone apps “Mobile Justice” and “Stop and Frisk” 
to record the police and hold them accountable); Your Right to Film Police, ACLU TEX., https://
www.aclutx.org/en/know-your-rights/your-right-film-police [https://perma.cc/T8XP-ZR3L] (en-
couraging the public to film the police and providing guidelines to film lawfully). 
 121 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b) (2016) (providing that the public has the right to record the 
police in public places but not explicitly limiting that right to the police performing their official 
duties); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128 (2016) (granting the public the ability to record “an inci-
dent” involving the police); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5) (2016) (granting the public the ability to 
record the police conducting official duties but not explicitly listing these official duties). 
 122 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 69(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-128; OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5). 
 123 See Jay Stanley, Suppression of Photographers During Civil Rights Movement an Important 
Reminder for Today, ACLU (May 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/
photographers-rights/suppression-photographers-during-civil-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/
E85H-ET4P] (discussing the role that photography played during the Civil Rights Movement to 
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burner issue and the courts have a responsibility to create a clear standard 
for the public.124 
The particular facts in Turner were unlike any of the cases that have 
addressed the First Amendment right to film the police and, therefore, the 
Fifth Circuit should have addressed this unique set of facts.125 Judge Clem-
ent was correct in her dissent in Turner when she declared that because the 
majority did not rule that the police officer violated the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment right, another officer acting in the same manner and under sim-
ilar circumstances would not be violating any clearly established law.126 
This application of the First Amendment right to film the police to the facts 
in Turner would have strengthened the authority of the case and provided 
guidance for future claimants and courts.127 
CONCLUSION 
In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled on the pub-
lic’s ability to record police activity in Turner v. Driver. With Turner, the 
Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to either expand or restrict the scope of con-
duct that is protected by the public’s First Amendment right to film the police. 
It failed to do either. By failing to connect the particular facts in the case to 
the First Amendment right to film the police and determine whether Turner’s 
conduct was even protected by said right, the Fifth Circuit effectively abdi-
cated its judicial responsibility. The Fifth Circuit established that the public 
has a First Amendment right to video record the police without adding any 
context or support to that right, outside First Amendment principles. As Judge 
Clement discussed in her dissent, defining this First Amendment right at such 
a high level of generality, without particularizing it to the facts in the case, 
does a disservice to future claimants and weakens the precedential power of 
the opinion. Additionally, given the current social and political climate, it 
keeps a pressing issue that deserves clarification on the back-burner. Alt-
hough the Fifth Circuit established that the public has a First Amendment 
right to video record the police, it failed to clarify the contours of that right. 
                                                                                                                           
highlight the injustices and brutality during the freedom marches and how the high use and availa-
bility of smartphones are having the same effect during the Black Lives Matter era). 
 124 See Jay Stanley, The Video Revolution in Policing, ACLU (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:39 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/video-revolution-policing?redirect=blog/video-revolution-
policing [https://perma.cc/T43C-DS8N]. This blog post by an American Civil Liberties Union 
Senior Policy Analyst explains that historically, judges, juries, and prosecutors have viewed police 
officers as more credible than the victims of police brutality and the emergence of videos from 
cellphone offers objectivity and another lens of visibility. Id. 
 125 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 686. 
 126 Id. at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting). 
 127 See id. 
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Turner leaves this newly developing body 
of case law without a sense of clarity or path forward. 
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